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EFFORTS TO DISCLOSE SOURCES OF ONLINE POLITICAL
ADVERTISING

Victoria Smith Ekstrand* & Ashley Fox**
The problem of disinformation in online political advertising is growing, with
ongoing and potential threats to campaigns coming from both within and outside the
United States. Most scholarship in this area has focused on either disclosures and
disclaimers under the proposed Honest Ads Act or other fixes aimed at a gridlocked
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). With federal reform at a standstill, states
have jumped into the void. Between the 2016 presidential election and early 2020,
eight states passed legislation to expressly regulate online political advertising for
state candidates and ballot measures, including Maryland, whose state law was
declared unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs by a federal
appellate court. This Article examines these state laws as well as the one federal
appellate court opinion as a springboard for thinking about efforts at the national
level to address the problem. We raise important considerations for future legislation
in light of the appellate court decision. We propose that a law establishing
independent record-keeping bodies, similar to those the state of New York has
established for independent expenditure committees, is more likely to pass First
Amendment scrutiny than a law requiring record-keeping of platforms or websites.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 16, 2018, U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted thirteen
Russians and three Russian organizations for interfering with the U.S. political and
electoral process, including the 2016 presidential election.1 The indictment spelled
out “in exhaustive detail the breadth and systematic nature of this conspiracy, dating
back to 2014, as well as the multiple ways in which Russian actors misused online
platforms to carry out their clandestine operations.” 2 Part of the Russian
disinformation campaign included “expenditures to carry out those activities,
1
Exposing Russia’s Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements,
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT
SELECT
COMM.
ON
INTEL.,
https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
2
Id.
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including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S.
persons and entities.”3 The Russians purchased numerous ads on social media that
promoted the accounts of disinformation groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience
members as well as ads that attacked the Clinton campaign and promoted the Trump
campaign.4 For example, the Russians promoted an account “Black Matters” calling
for a “flash mob” of U.S. persons to “take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016
or #noHillary2016.”5 They also created ads for an Instagram account “Tea Party
News,” asking U.S. persons to help them “make a patriotic team of young Trump
supporters” by uploading photos with the hashtag “#KIDS4TRUMP.”6 The Mueller
investigation and subsequent report prompted questions around a largely unregulated
online political advertising landscape.
The problem of online political ads pushing disinformation is growing,
according to experts, with ongoing and potential threats to campaigns from both
within and outside the United States. From a First Amendment perspective, the
problem is compounded by the emerging difficulty of distinguishing traditional,
regulated political advertising from general, largely unregulated political content. In
November 2019, the New York Times reported that a search for videos of Senator
Kamala Harris revealed dozens of videos claiming Senator Harris is not an American
citizen. 7 Should such content be treated as traditional political advertising or as
political content? Is pointing out the falsehoods enough in a growing environment of
fake bots and trolls? The constitutionality of any potential regulation of online
political ads begins with both defining the environment and the harms. But that task
is difficult, as the lines between traditional political advertising and general political
content continue to blur.
Furthermore, the threats posed by mis- and disinformation are increasingly
coming from within the United States, according to researchers.8 That is in part
because online political advertising is dominated by two American platforms:
Google (37.2%) and Facebook (19.6%) “make up a majority of the online ad
3

Indictment at 4, United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018)
(No. 18-cr-0032-2 (DLF)), https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download.
4
Id. at 18–19, 21–22, 25–27, 30.
5
SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, I REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 25 (2019).
6
Id.
7
Jonathan Martin et al., How Kamala Harris’s Campaign Unraveled, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/29/us/politics/kamala-harris-2020.html.
8
According to Paul Barrett, deputy director of New York University’s Stern Center for Business and
Human Rights and author of a report showing an increasing threat from within the United States, “[i]t’s likely
that there will be a high volume of misinformation and disinformation pegged to the 2020 election, with the
majority of it being generated right here in the United States, as opposed to coming from overseas.” Alexandra
S. Levine et al., Why the Fight Against Disinformation, Sham Accounts and Trolls Won’t Be Any Easier in 2020,
POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2019, 6:49 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/01/fight-against-disinformation2020-election-074422; see also Sonam Sheth, “The Country is in a State of Trauma;” COVID-19 Has Made the
US a Breeding Ground for Propoganda and a Goldmine for Foreign Spies, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2020, 11:25
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-trump-us-disinformation-foreign-interference-2020-4
(reporting that Barrett “told Insider he’s seen an explosion of domestically sourced dis- and misinformation
related to the [Covid-19] outbreak”).
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market” in the United States and “accounted for 99% of the industry’s revenue
growth” in 2016.9 According to one estimate in November 2019, more than $67
million had been spent by the 2020 presidential candidates on Facebook, $32
million on Google, and $5.2 million on Twitter—all since the platforms and social
media sites began tracking such purchases themselves in 2018 (see Figure One).10

Figure One: 2020 Digital Ad Wars11

With such explosive and unregulated growth in the online political ad market, the
potential effect on future elections is both immediate and alarming.
Reaction to such threats has been swift, but actual movement to address the
problem is slow and uncertain, due primarily to the scale of the problem, political
gridlock, and debate about how best to address the problem. The platforms,
particularly under fire since the Mueller investigation, have announced immediate
changes. Twitter announced in fall 2019 it will reject all political advertising, 12
9

Katherine Haenschen & Jordan Wolf, Disclaiming Responsibility: How Platforms Deadlocked the
Federal Election Commission’s Efforts to Regulate Digital Political Advertising, TELECOMM. POL’Y, Sept.
2019, at 1, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596118304105.
10
Anna Massoglia & Karl Evers-Hillstrom, 2020 Presidential Candidates Top $100M in Digital Ad
Spending
as
Twitter
Goes
Dark,
OPEN
SECRETS
(Nov.
14,
2019,
2:08
PM),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/11/digital-ad-spending-2020-presidential-candidates-top-100m/.
11
Id.
12
Jack
Dorsey
(@jack),
TWITTER
(Oct.
30,
2019,
4:05
PM),
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952.
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prompting criticism about exactly how political advertising will be defined. 13
Facebook announced it will not fact-check political ads because of its commitment to
free expression and an open marketplace of ideas.14 Facebook and Google announced
plans to instead limit microtargeting, the process by which campaigns and interest
groups send messages to small and highly selective groups of people.15 Critics say
microtargeting contributes to voter manipulation, invasions of privacy, and voter
exclusion. 16 More broadly, the practice has been criticized for fragmenting a
democratic commitment to the marketplace of ideas.17 Other platforms have made
self-regulatory moves, but the industry-led moves change regularly with each new
problem encountered (see Figure Two). The needs are immediate, but the potential
solutions are too complicated to be effectively and immediately implemented by any
one new platform, policy, or law.

13
Shannon C. McGregor, Why Twitter’s Ban On Political Ads Isn’t as Good as it Sounds, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/04/twitters-political-ads-ban.
14
Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, Defiant Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Police Political Speech, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/business/zuckerberg-facebook-free-speech.html;
see also Tony Romm, Zuckerberg: Standing for Voice and Free Expression, WASH. POST (Oct. 17 2019, 4:22
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/17/zuckerberg-standing-voice-free-expression/.
15
Alex Hern, Facebook to Curb Microtargeting in Political Advertising, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019,
1:50
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/nov/22/facebook-to-curb-microtargeting-inpolitical-advertising.
16
Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for
Democracy, 14 UTRECHT L. REV. 82, 87 (2018).
17
Id. at 89.
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Figure Two: Platform Political Ad Policies18

While political communication scholars have been actively writing about the
problem of online political advertising for several years, legal scholars have just
begun to focus on the issue.19 Most of the legal scholarship has been focused on the
federal level, addressing either the proposed Honest Ads Act20 or other fixes aimed at
a gridlocked Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). 21 With federal reform at a
standstill, states have jumped into the void. Between the 2016 presidential election
and early 2020, eight states passed legislation to expressly regulate online political
advertising for state candidates and ballot measures,22 including Maryland, whose
state law was declared unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs by a
federal appellate court.23 The purpose of this Article is to examine these recent state
18
Hanna Kozlowska, Each Platform’s Approach to Political Ads in One Table, QUARTZ (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://qz.com/1767145/how-facebook-twitter-and-others-approach-political-advertising/.
19
Scholarship about online political advertising in political communication is at least seven years old. See,
e.g., Lisa Barnard & Daniel Kreiss, A Research Agenda for Online Political Advertising: Surveying Campaign
Practices, 2000–2012, 7 INT’L J. COMMC’N 2046, 2047 (2013). Scholarship in the legal literature about online
political advertising is much more recent. See sources cited infra notes 64–76.
20
S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017); see also S. 1356, 116th Cong. (2019).
21
See Note, Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation?, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1421 (2018).
22
See infra Part II.
23
Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520–22 (4th Cir. 2019).
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laws as well as the one federal appellate court opinion as a springboard for thinking
about efforts at the national level to address the problem. We raise important
considerations for future legislation in light of the appellate court decision.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I briefly addresses the
landscape of political advertising regulation and the new and growing literature on
online political advertising. It assesses what other scholars have suggested about
potential regulatory approaches. Part II analyzes the eight state laws designed to
regulate online political advertising. Part III outlines the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit decision addressing the constitutionality of Maryland’s regulation.
Part IV compares states’ regulatory efforts and raises a series of questions that must
be answered if online political ad regulation is to survive First Amendment scrutiny.
Part V concludes with a few observations about this regulatory moment in campaign
finance law in light of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling and makes recommendations for
future legislation.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING REGULATION
Political communication scholars have spent the last decade or more studying the
growth of digital political advertising, electioneering, and campaign and issue-group
microtargeting online. Legal scholars have only more recently focused on the new
harms caused by the lack of online political advertising and electioneering oversight.24
Scholars in both disciplines describe the landscape and nature of the problems, as well
as the potential for expanding campaign finance regulation and/or industry selfregulation. An interdisciplinary approach to online political advertising will be
critical to any regulatory effort. We maintain that such an approach is needed to
effectively: (1) define the scope of online political advertising; (2) identify the
specific harms that regulation might address; and (3) propose potential solutions that
will pass constitutional muster and actually address the harms.
This Section proceeds as follows: First, it reviews important background material
on federal campaign finance regulation and the nature and scope of online political
advertising as defined by scholars. Any new rules for online ads will have to fit within
a complicated, and already existing, campaign finance framework. Then, we address
a discussion of the scholarly support for expanding campaign finance regulation to
include online political advertising. Legal and political communication scholars
mostly agree that such regulation should be considered; any disagreement is mostly
about how to execute such a change and to what degree the platforms can selfregulate.

24

See sources cited infra notes 64–76 and accompanying text.
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A. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES, LEGAL TESTS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
The difference between protected political speech and regulated political
advertising is one of the most difficult First Amendment needles scholars and
regulators have attempted to thread over the last half-century. An unregulated
marketplace of ideas for political advertising invites corrupt actors to spend limitless
dollars and spread lies to the electorate, but an overly regulated one threatens core
First Amendment values protecting political speech. Such core values encourage
marketplace participants to debate about issues and candidates––precisely what the
Framers had in mind. Under that model, lies about candidates and issues are
debunked by effective counterspeech. The counterspeech doctrine is based on Justice
Brandeis’ call to “expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education . . . .”25 Here, “the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”26
Scholars and observers, however, are increasingly skeptical of the counterspeech
doctrine’s ability to expose mis- and disinformation online. Philip Napoli identifies
several reasons for the diminished efficacy of counterspeech and the rise of mis- and
disinformation, including: the death of local news; the low barriers and cheap costs
of producing “fake news”; the rise of self-publishing, microtargeting, and echo
chambers; and the speed and volume of online information.27 Tim Wu argues that,
“[w]hen listeners have highly limited bandwidth to devote to any given issue, they will rarely
dig deeply, and they are less likely to hear dissenting opinions. In such an environment,
[information] flooding can be just as effective as more traditional forms of censorship.” 28

Increasing discursive practices including online cancel culture,29 in which speakers
remove their support for others in response to objectionable behaviors or opinions,
and the heckler’s veto, 30 by which speakers severely and substantially disrupt a
speech or proceeding, also place pressure on the success of counterspeech.31
Against this backdrop is a decades-long struggle in the U.S. to define and regulate
political advertising at large. This struggle largely begins with the Federal Election
Campaign Act (“FECA”), passed in 1971, and amended in 1974.32 Together, FECA
and its subsequent amendments created limits on campaign contributions and
independent expenditures in an attempt to thwart corrosive influences. 33 FECA
25

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
Id.
27
Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake
News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 57, 69–70, 85–86 (2018).
28
Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete.
29
What It Means to Get ‘Canceled,’ MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-atplay/cancel-culture-words-were-watching (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
30
Zach
Greenberg,
Rejecting
the
‘Heckler’s
Veto,’
FIRE
(June
14,
2017),
https://www.thefire.org/rejecting-the-hecklers-veto/.
31
Sanam Yar & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Tales From the Teenage Cancel Culture, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/style/cancel-culture.html.
32
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at
52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146).
33
See id.
26
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defines “federal election activity” to include a “public communication” (i.e., a
broadcast, cable, satellite, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass
mailing, or telephone bank communication made to the general public) or “[a]ny other
general public political advertising.” 34 Although political communication is
generally protected by the First Amendment, the spending of money with “express
advocacy”—the words “vote for,” “elect,” or “support”—may be limited under
FECA.35
Many groups, following FECA, found it easy to advocate for candidates without
using these words. In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”)
strengthened election law by requiring disclosures from groups that run
“electioneering communications”—essentially closing the loophole that groups had
discovered after FECA.36 An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable
or satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal
office” and is made within either, thirty days of a primary election, or sixty days of a
general election. 37 This widened the law to exclude the express advocacy
requirement.
In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of FECA in Buckley v.
Valeo.38 While the Court upheld campaign contribution limits, it struck down limits
on individual and interest-group expenditures, ruling that the limits would not thwart
corruption and that spending was equivalent to speech, so the limits violated the First
Amendment.39 Importantly for our purposes, the Court also upheld FECA’s reporting
and disclosure requirements, which required political committees to register with the
FEC and keep records of expenditures and contributions.40 The Court acknowledged
that disclosure might infringe on First Amendment rights but applied an “exacting
scrutiny” test that required the government to prove that its interest in regulating bear
a “substantial relation” to the information disclosed.41
In Buckley, the Court identified three compelling state interests that justify
campaign finance disclosure requirements, including (1) the information that
disclosure provides to voters; (2) the deterrence of corruption and the “appearance of
corruption”; and (3) the enforcement of campaign finance laws.42 The Supreme Court
has continuously upheld this exacting scrutiny test in subsequent cases challenging
BCRA disclosure requirements, such as in McConnell v. FEC43 and Citizens United
34

52 U.S.C. § 30101(20), (22).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n. 52 (1976) (“This construction would restrict the application of
[section] 608(e)(1) [of FECA] to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or
defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’
‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”).
36
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), § 304, 116 Stat. 81, 89 (2002)
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)).
37
Id. § 304(f)(3).
38
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
39
Id. at 44–49.
40
Id. at 83.
41
Id. at 64.
42
Id. at 67–68.
43
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
35
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v. FEC.44 The broader topic of campaign finance disclosure typically encompasses
what Abby Wood describes as two separate acts: disclosures and sponsorship
disclaimers. 45 While disclosures often involve submitting finance reports to
regulators, sponsorship disclaimers appear on political advertisements to identify the
person or group who paid for the ads.46 State and federal laws vary in the terminology
that they use to describe sponsorship disclaimers. Various laws often refer to these
“paid for by” statements as a “disclosure” 47 a “disclaimer,” 48 a “statement,” 49 an
“identification requirement,”50 or an “authority line.”51 To maintain consistency with
previous scholarship and throughout this article, we use the term “sponsorship
disclaimer,” to describe “paid for by” statements on political ads.
B. ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING: HISTORY, DEFINITIONS, AND CALLS FOR
REGULATION
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) did not include the internet as
a form of “public communication” under federal campaign finance law,52 and it did
not address the growth of “dark money” groups.53 Nevertheless, the FEC required
disclaimers for “(1) unsolicited emails that political committees sen[t] to more than
500 people[;] and (2) websites that political committees ma[d]e available to the
public.”54 In 2004, in Shays v. FEC,55 a U.S. district court found the FEC's exclusion
of online political communication from “public communication” impermissible. 56
Following Shays, the FEC amended the definition of “public communication” to
include paid internet advertising on someone else's website.57 But two subsequent
FEC administrative orders and two Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(“ANPRM”) sessions in 2011 and 2016 did little to shed light on growing questions
and concerns regarding online political advertising. With very few comments in

44

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Abby K. Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 11, 13 (2018).
Id.
47
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-110 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1-3 of 2020 Special Legis. Sess.).
48
See, e.g., 11 C.F.R. § 100.11; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-45-107.5(5), 1-45-108.3 (2019).
49
See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30120; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c. 127
and J.R. No. 2).
50
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2972(a) ) (LEXIS through Act 150 of the 2019 (Adj. Sess.) and
Municipal Act M-11 of the 2019 (Adj. Sess.).
51
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 13-401 (West, Westlaw through all legislation from the 2020
Regular Session of the General Assembly).
52
Brian Beyersdorf, Note, Regulating the “Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in History”: Disclosure
Requirements in Online Political Advertisements After the 2016 Election, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1074 (2019).
53
See generally Wood, supra note 45.
54
Beyersdorf, supra note 52, at 1074 (citing Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,600 (Apr. 12,
2006) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 110, 114)).
55
Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).
56
Id. at 79 (“[T]he Court finds that . . . Congress intended all other forms of ‘general public political
advertising’ to be covered by the term ‘public communication.’ What constitutes ‘general public political
advertising’ in the world of the Internet is a matter for the FEC to determine.”).
57
Beyersdorf, supra note 52, at 1075 (citing Public Communication, 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (2018)).
45
46
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either rulemaking session, the FEC did not issue a new rule, despite increasing
concerns.58
As Daniel Kreiss and Lisa Barnard point out, “the lines around what constitutes
an online [political] ‘advertisement’ have continually shifted.”59 It is not surprising,
given this legal history, that there has been “considerable confusion in the literature
around the terminology scholars use to describe online [political] advertising.” 60
While some legal and political communication scholars have called for a broad
definition, others have seen value in defining the “distinctive aspects of online
advertising: the ability to narrowly target voters and track the effectiveness of ads in
meeting strategic electoral goals.” 61 Indeed, Kreiss and Barnard define online
political ads as “that which: (1) campaigns or other political actors produce as discrete
components of wider strategic communications efforts[;] (2) involves systematically
evaluating progress toward defined goals through data[;] and (3) is conducted by a
group of specialists recognized as such by their peers.”62 They base this definition on
the ways that practitioners themselves describe online ad practices.63
Abby Wood and Ann Ravel, however, argue for a broader conception of online
political advertising in the wake of problems surrounding the 2016 election.64 They
explain that online political advertising is a “problem of native political advertising
and that the phenomenon benefits from a lack of campaign finance transparency
online.”65 These scholars detail the myriad of harms caused by bad actors leading up
to the 2016 election. They describe studies of Facebook that concluded that 86% of
groups running paid ads in the last six week before the election were suspicious
groups (53%), astroturf movement groups (17.1%), and questionable news outlets
(15.8%).66 In defining online political advertising broadly, they called for regulators
to:
[S]ave and post every version of every political communication placed online,
whether video, print, or image, and whether placed “for a fee” or not. The
communications should be placed on a dedicated and easy-to-locate page on the
campaign's or group's website or user page on the platform, as well as on a dedicated
page created by the platform. The communications should be stored in their entirety,
and they should be posted along with a uniform set of data stored in a uniform format
for easy analysis and comparison across campaigns, across platforms, and over time.
The FEC should also retain this data, for longer term storage, and to ensure that it
exists even when platforms change or cease to operate. In addition to the
communication itself, the online political advertising repository should contain the

58

Id. at 1080–81.
Barnard & Kreiss, supra note 19, at 2047.
60
Id. at 2048.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and Other Online
Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (2018).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1230.
59

Journal of Legislation

92

following data: when the communications ran; how much they cost to place and
promote; candidates to which the communications refer; contested seat/issues
mentioned; targeting criteria used; number of people targeted; and a platformprovided Audience [sic] identifier (“Audience ID”).67

Wood and Ravel did not address either the practical or questionable legal
feasibility of their idea, but such a proposal would require significant monitoring and
oversight. The platforms themselves, as previously mentioned, have begun some of
this monitoring on their own. Beyond the platforms, it is not clear how and who
would be responsible for collecting such data, although the authors do propose that
the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network would be a better fit than
the FEC.68 Other scholars have similarly detailed the incompetency of the FEC in
recent years and called for a major overhaul of that administrative body.69
Wood and Ravel are joined by a few other legal commentators in their call for
new regulation. Millicent Usoro argued that despite anti-regulatory First Amendment
jurisprudence in recent years, the First Amendment is not an automatic shield against
regulation of a new medium.70 She argued that throughout history, the Court has
extended new rules to new media, particularly to protect national security and
electoral interests.71 Irina Dykhne argued that online political ads should always have
links to sponsorship disclaimers or “rollovers” 72 —and that advertisers should be
allowed to propose other technological ways to disclaim.73 Additionally, Dykhne
argued that ads containing 200 characters or more should be considered online ads
and should not be eligible for FEC rules excluding small and impracticable items from
disclaimer requirements.74
Brian Beyersdorf wrote that platform self-policing will not be enough and
supports the Honest Ads Act (“HHA”), which expands the definition of “public
communication,” requires disclaimers and records for online ads, and prohibits
foreign meddling.75 Pichaya Winichakul wrote that the problem of online political
advertising is primarily structural. She criticized the FEC for failing to:
[I]nitiate an enforcement action against the [Russian] Internet Research Agency
for not disclosing $100,000 spent on digital advertisements that did not carry a
disclaimer, activities that existing FEC rules currently reach. Nor does the [HHA]
address the FEC's nonenforcement of a provision well within the FEC's powers that
prohibits the involvement of non-U.S. citizens in electoral activities. In other words,
67

Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1275.
69
Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation?, supra note 21; see also
Pichaya P. Winichakul, Note, The Missing Structural Debate: Reforming Disclosure of Online Political
Communications, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1387 (2018).
70
Millicent Usoro, Note, A Medium-Specific First Amendment Analysis on Controlled Campaign Finance
Disclosure on the Internet, 71 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 299 (2019).
71
Id. at 320–23.
72
A “rollover” disclaimer is a disclaimer statement that appears for a set period of time when a user holds
their computer cursor over the advertisement. See Irina Dykhne, Note, Persuasive or Deceptive? Native
Advertising in Political Campaigns, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 371 (2018).
73
Dykhne, supra note 72, at 370–71.
74
Id. at 370.
75
Beyersdorf, supra note 52, at 1090.
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it is already within the FEC's power to require the Internet Research Agency to
disclose information about its funding sources and to punish the Internet Research
Agency for failing to disclose.76

While scholars and federal regulators disagree about responsibility and solutions,
states have not waited to regulate. 77 Eight states now have statutes addressing
sponsorship disclaimer and record-keeping requirements for online political
advertising.78 In a recent Fourth Circuit decision, one state’s law has already been
declared unconstitutional as applied to specific plaintiffs.79
II. STATE EFFORTS TO REGULATE ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING
Between the 2016 presidential election and early 2020, several states enacted
new legislation or amended existing legislation on political advertising to regulate
online political advertising for state candidates and ballot measures. 80 These
legislative efforts primarily fall into two categories: (1) state laws that establish only
sponsorship disclaimer requirements; and (2) state laws that establish both disclaimer
requirements and additional record-keeping requirements that often include
maintaining digital archives.81
A. STATES THAT ONLY HAVE SPONSORSHIP DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENTS
1. Colorado
In 2019, the Colorado General Assembly amended existing campaign
finance legislation to include sponsorship disclaimers for “electioneering
communications” 82 and “independent expenditures” 83 that appear on a “website,

76

Winichakul, supra note 69, at 1396 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
Kelly Born, How States Are Experimenting with Digital Political Advertising Regulation: Interview with
Campaign Legal Center’s Erin Chlopak, HEWLETT FOUND. (May 28, 2019), https://hewlett.org/how-states-areexperimenting-with-digital-political-advertising-regulation-interview-with-campaign-legal-centers-erinchlopak/.
78
See infra Part II.
79
Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 510 (4th Cir. 2019).
80
Born, supra note 77.
81
Id.
82
Colorado law defines an “electioneering communication” as:
Any communication broadcasted by television or radio, printed in a newspaper or
on a billboard, directly mailed or delivered by hand to personal residences or otherwise
distributed that: (I) [u]nambiguously refers to a candidate; (II) [i]s broadcasted, printed,
mailed, delivered, or distributed within thirty days before a primary election or sixty days
before a general election; and (III) [i]s broadcasted to, printed in a newspaper distributed
to, mailed to, delivered by hand to, or otherwise distributed to an audience that includes
members of the electorate for such public office.
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a).
83
Colorado law defines an “independent expenditure” as “an expenditure that is not controlled by or
coordinated with any candidate or agent of such candidate.” Id. § 2(9).
77

Journal of Legislation

94

streaming media service, or online forum.” 84 These disclaimers must state the
purchaser’s name or the name of the purchaser’s “registered agent” (if the purchaser
is not a “natural person”), using the language “paid for by.”85 The statute provides an
exception for when these disclaimers are not practical, stating that rules promulgated
by the Secretary of State must require a hyperlink to a webpage containing the
disclaimer.86
2. Vermont
Vermont’s sponsorship disclaimer requirements for online political
advertising apply to “electioneering communication[s].”87 In May 2018, the Vermont
General Assembly amended its existing political advertising laws to specifically
include “mass electronic or digital communications” within the broader definition of
“electioneering communication.” 88 Electioneering communications disseminated
online must clearly state the name and, for all non-audio ads, the address of the
candidate, person, or group that paid for the ads or the candidate, person, or group on
whose behalf they were purchased.89 Ads purchased by or on behalf of a political
committee or political party must also list on the ad the names of donors who have
contributed more than $2,000 or 25% of the group’s total donations since the start of
the current two-year election cycle. 90 Vermont includes one exception to these
requirements: if following the disclaimer requirements would be impractical, the
communication can instead hyperlink to a separate page containing the disclaimers.91
3. Wyoming
Wyoming’s online political advertising regulations only include sponsorship
disclaimer requirements. 92 In 2019, the Wyoming State Legislature amended the
forms of political advertising that require disclaimers to include internet and
electronic communications.93 Political advertising distributed online and paid for by
a candidate, candidate campaign committee, political action committee (“PAC”),
political party committee, or other organization that makes electioneering
communications or independent expenditures must state the name of the purchaser.94
Wyoming also provides an exception for when incorporating disclaimers may be
84

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-45-107.5(5), 1-45-108.3 (2019).
Id.
86
Id.
87
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2972(a). Vermont law defines an “electioneering communication” as “any
communication [including digital communications] that refers to a clearly identified candidate for public office
and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office,
regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate.” Id. § 2901(6).
88
Id.
89
Id. § 2972(a)–(b).
90
Id. § 2972(c)(1).
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Id. § 2972(d).
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unworkable because of the advertisement’s size or text restrictions by stating that the
disclaimer may instead be given via a hyperlink to a separate webpage.95
B. STATES WITH BOTH SPONSORSHIP DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENTS AND
RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENTS
1. California
California updated its laws on online political advertising in October 2019.96
California regulates online political ads under a somewhat complex statutory scheme
and discusses advertising using the terms “electronic media advertisements” and
“online platform disclosed advertisements.”97 Although California does not seem to
define “electronic media advertisement,” the state defines an “online platform
disclosed advertisement” as either (1) “[a] paid electronic media advertisement on an
online platform” that allows for user-generated content, “unless all advertisements on
the platform are video advertisements that can comply” with the sponsorship
disclaimer requirements for videos; or (2) “[a] paid electronic media advertisement
on an online platform that is not . . . [a] graphic, image, animated graphic, or animated
image” that can link to a separate website containing the required disclaimer or a
“[v]ideo, audio, or email.”98 Disclaimer requirements for online political advertising
in California vary slightly based on who paid for the ad, whether the ad discusses a
candidate or a ballot measure, and the medium of the ad.99 Although the statutory
language of California’s political advertising laws is fairly complex, the California
Fair Political Practices Commission provides numerous compliance resources for
parties purchasing political ads, including online political ads that are not “online
platform disclosed advertisements.”100
First, candidate committees are not required to include disclaimers on all
electronic media advertisements they disseminate for that candidate’s own election.101
However, the California Fair Political Practices Commission recommends that
candidate committees state the committee’s name and committee ID number and
notes that a “paid for by” disclaimer is required for paid social media ads.102
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Id. § 22-25-110(a)(iv).
2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 558 (A.B. 864) (West) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 84305, 84501–
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Dec. 30, 2020).
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Committees other than candidate or political party committees that purchase nonvideo electronic media ads with graphic elements or animation must state the name
of the committee and link to a separate webpage that states the committee’s top donors
and is available for thirty days after the election. 103 Disclaimers for independent
expenditures that support or oppose a candidate must include a statement indicating
that no candidate or candidate committee authorized the ad.104
Candidate and political party committees that purchase non-video electronic
media ads with graphic elements or animation and support or oppose a ballot measure
must state the committee’s name. 105 If the ad also qualifies as an independent
expenditure, it must link to a separate webpage that includes the committee’s name.106
This page must be available for thirty days after the election. 107 If the ad was
purchased by an independent expenditure supports or opposes a candidate, it must
include a statement indicating that no candidate or candidate committee authorized
the ad.108
Those purchasing audio and video electronic media ads are directed to follow
separate, but analogous, disclaimer requirements in place for all audio and video
ads.109 Audio ads purchased by a candidate committee or political party committee
must state the name of the committee. 110 Committees, other than candidate
103
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 84503, 84504.3(a)(1)–(b), 84504.3(e); see also CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N,
POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURES: ALL NON-INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE ADS (EXCEPT ADS BY
CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES) (2020), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NSDocuments/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_6_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf; CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURE: INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURE ADS ON BALLOT MEASURES (EXCEPT ADS BY CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY
COMMITTEES)
(2020),
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NSDocuments/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_3_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf; CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURES: INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURE ADS ON CANDIDATES (EXCEPT ADS BY CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES)
(2020),
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NSDocuments/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_2_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf.
104
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.3(a)–(b), 84506.5.
105
Id. § 84504.3(a)(2)–(b); see also CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, POLITICAL ADVERTISING
DISCLOSURES: ALL NON-INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE ADS BY CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY
COMMITTEES
(2020),
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NSDocuments/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_7_Fina
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http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NSDocuments/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/CampaignAdvertisementDisclosure/2020%20Disclaimers_4_Fina
l%20V.1.pdf [hereinafter ADS ON BALLOT MEASURES BY CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES];
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committees and political party committees, who purchase audio electronic media ads
must follow these same requirements, in addition to stating the committee’s top
contributors.111 If the ad is also an independent expenditure supporting a candidate,
it must state that a candidate or candidate committee did not authorize the ad.112 The
disclaimers required for video electronic media ads are largely the same as those
required for audio ads.113
California imposes separate requirements for platforms hosting “online
platform disclosed advertisements.” 114 In California, platforms subject to these
requirements include any “public-facing internet website, web application, or digital
application . . . that sells advertisements directly to advertisers” unless the website or
application “displays advertisements that are sold directly to advertisers through
another online platform.”115 First, platforms are required to either place a disclaimer
next to the ad with the name of the committee that paid for it or link to a webpage
with the committee’s name using a separate button.116 Second, when a committee has
spent more than $500 on ad space from that platform in the past year, the platform is
required to keep publicly accessible records about ads from that committee.117 These
records must include copies of the ad, the number of impressions the ad received, the
date and time the ad was first displayed, the date and time the ad was last displayed,
the cost of the ad, the candidate or ballot measure that is the subject of the ad, and the
name and ID number of the purchasing committee.118 These records must be kept by
the platform for four years.119
2. New Jersey
The New Jersey Legislature amended the state’s political advertising laws in
2019 to apply to “internet and digital” political advertising purchased by any person
or group.120 Under the law, internet and digital ads (1) “promoting the nomination,
election or defeat of any candidate or providing political information on any
candidate”; (2) promoting “the passage or defeat of any public question or providing
political information on any public question”; or (3) promoting “the passage or defeat
of legislation or regulation in the case of an independent expenditure committee” must
state the name and address of the ad’s purchaser.121 Additionally, ads that are not
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made in coordination with a candidate or someone acting on a candidate’s behalf must
state that independent status on the ad itself.122
In New Jersey, parties that are paid to disseminate political advertising must
keep a copy of the ad and the name and address of the ad’s purchaser, as well as either
“the number of copies made or the dates and times” the ad was distributed.123 These
records must be publicly available for two years, but there is no requirement that these
records be made available online.124
3. New York
In 2018, New York enacted the Democracy Protection Act to incorporate
online political advertising into the state’s definition of regulated political
communication. 125 The New York State Assembly further amended the law in
November 2019, and these amended requirements became effective starting in
January 2020.126 Under the amended law, digital political communications purchased
by a political committee must state that the ad was “paid for by” that committee.127
New York’s sponsorship disclaimer requirement also includes an exception128: If the
ad is too small to include the disclaimer, the required information may be provided
by a hyperlink to a separate webpage.129 In addition to stating the name of the ad’s
purchaser using the “paid for by” language, internet and digital advertisements that
also qualify as an independent expenditure must state that the ad was not “expressly
authorized or requested” by a candidate.130
Although New York imposes record-keeping requirements for online
political advertisements made by independent expenditure committees, New York is
unique in that the responsibility for maintaining publicly accessible databases falls to
the New York State Board of Elections rather than online platforms disseminating
political ads.131 In this database, the Board maintains copies of the ad, scripts of any
audio or video elements, descriptions of any visual elements, screenshots of ads
without audio or video elements, and individual images for ads with animated
elements.132 These records are maintained for five years.133
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4. Washington
Washington amended its laws regulating political advertising in 2018.134 The
laws apply to three categories of advertising: political advertising,135 electioneering
communications, 136 and independent expenditures. 137 Each of these categories
includes digital communications.138 Online political advertisements must state the
purchaser’s name and address.139 If political advertising or a series of political ads is
paid for by a committee, supports or opposes a ballot measure, and costs $1,000 or
more, the ad must also state the committee’s top five contributors and, if a top
contributor is a separate PAC, the top three contributors to that PAC.140 Additionally,
if a candidate in a partisan election associates himself with a political party in a
declaration of candidacy, that party designation must also be included in the
disclaimer.141
Online political ads that also qualify as electioneering communications or
independent expenditures and are purchased by someone other than a political party
are required to make additional disclaimers.142 First, these ads must state that “[n]o
candidate authorized this ad” and include the address of the purchaser in addition to
the purchaser’s name.143 If the ad was paid for by a political committee, it must also
state the person or entity that established, controls, or maintains the committee as well
as the committee’s top five contributors and top three donors to PAC contributors, no
matter the cost of the advertising.144
Washington requires “commercial advertiser[s]” that place ads to maintain
publicly accessible records about those ads and to provide records related to the ads
to the Washington State Public Disclosure Commission upon request.145 The state
134
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.005 (2019) (West, Westlaw through all legislation from the 2020 Regular
Session of the Washington Legislature).
135
Washington defines “political advertising” as “any advertising displays [including digital] used for the
purpose of appealing, directly or indirectly, for votes or for financial or other support or opposition in any
election campaign.” Id. § 42.17A.005(40).
136
Washington defines “electioneering communication” as including any digital communication that
“clearly identifies a candidate for a state, local, or judicial office,” is distributed “within sixty days before any
election for that office in the jurisdiction in which the candidate is seeking election,” and “has a fair market
value or cost of one thousand dollars or more.” Id. § 42.17A.005(21).
137
Washington defines “independent expenditure” as including political advertising “made in support or
opposition to a candidate for office by a person who is not [a] candidate for that office, [a]n authorized committee
of that candidate for that office, [or] [a] person who has received the candidate’s encouragement or approval to
make the expenditure.” Id. § 42.17A.005(30)(i). The expenditure must also be made without collaboration with
the candidate it supports or opposes, specifically name the candidate or otherwise clearly identify them, and
either alone or combined with other expenditures purchased by the same person, cost $1,000 or more. Id. §
42.17A.005(30)(ii)–(iv).
138
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broadly defines “commercial advertiser” as “any person that sells the service of
communicating messages.”146 The records must include the names and addresses of
ad purchasers, the “exact nature and extent of the services” provided to ad purchasers
by the platform, and the cost of the platform’s services. 147 However, there is no
requirement that these records be available online.148
5. Maryland
In 2018, the Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act
amended Maryland’s existing political advertising laws to include “qualifying paid
digital communication[s]” 149 within the definition of regulated “campaign
material[s].”150 Maryland requires qualifying paid digital communications that are
distributed by a “campaign finance entity” to state the name and address of the entity’s
treasurer and all entities for which that person is serving as treasurer.151 Other parties
that pay for qualifying political ads must state that party’s name and address. 152
However, under both of these scenarios, ads may omit addresses that are already filed
with the State or a local board of elections.153 Qualifying paid digital communications
that are not authorized by a candidate must also state that fact.154
Maryland law also imposes record-keeping requirements on platforms who
disseminate qualifying paid digital communications.155 Under the law, platforms are
required to maintain publicly accessible, online databases containing different
information about the ads depending on who purchased them.156 For ads bought by a
political committee, platforms must record the purchaser’s name and contact
information, the committee’s treasurer, and the amount paid.157 For ads bought by an
ad network, platforms must record the network’s contact information and include a
hyperlink to the contact page of the network’s website.158 For ads bought by someone
other than a political committee or an ad network, platforms must record the
purchaser’s name and contact information, the amount paid, and the name of anyone
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candidate, or the approval or rejection of a question or a prospective question; and (iii) is published, distributed,
or disseminated.” Id. § 1-101(k)(1)–(2).
151
Id. § 13-401(a)(1)(i).
152
Id. § 13-401(a)(1)(ii).
153
Id. § 13-401(a)(2).
154
Id. § 13-401(b).
155
Id. § 13-405(b).
156
Id.
157
Id. § 13-405(b)(6)(i).
158
Id. § 13-405(b)(6)(iii).
147

101

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 47:1]

that controls the purchaser, like a CEO.159 These records should be collected within
forty-eight hours of the ad’s purchase and kept for one year following the next general
election.160 If the ad has not yet been paid for, platforms can request a waiver from
the Maryland State Board of Elections to expand the two-day collection period to
seven days.161 However, platforms seeking a waiver must explain why compliance
would present an “unreasonable burden” and note how the platform will comply in
the future.162 Platforms cannot apply for more than one waiver or apply for a waiver
within thirty days of an election.163
In addition to these record-keeping requirements, platforms disseminating
qualifying paid digital communications are required to provide the State Board of
Elections with information about the candidate or ballot issue discussed in the ad,
whether the ad “support[ed] or oppos[ed] that candidate or ballot issue,” the first date
and time the ad was distributed, the last date and time the ad was distributed, a copy
of the ad, the geographic location and audience targeted, and the number of times the
ad was viewed. 164 Similar to platforms’ other record-keeping requirements, this
information should be available to the State Board within forty-eight hours of when
the ad is distributed and kept by the platform for one year following the next general
election.165
What qualifies as a platform subject to the law’s record-keeping
requirements is broad. Under the Act, a “platform” is a “public-facing website, web
application, or digital application, including a social network, ad network, or search
engine, that (1) has 100,000 or more unique monthly United States visitors or users
for a majority of months during the [past year]; and (2) receives payment for
qualifying paid digital communications.”166 In December 2019, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that Maryland’s requirements for platforms that disseminate online
political advertising were unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs.167
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO MARYLAND’S LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
In December 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled
that the responsibilities Maryland’s online political advertising law imposed on online
platforms were unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs, including
the Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun, among others.168 Although the Fourth
Circuit determined that Maryland had significant interests in preventing foreign
election interference, encouraging an informed public, and discouraging corruption,
159
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the law’s requirements for online platforms were not sufficiently tailored to pass
either strict or exacting constitutional scrutiny.169
The Fourth Circuit characterized the law’s requirements for online platforms
as falling into two separate categories. 170 First, the law imposed a “publication
requirement” that obligated plaintiffs to create and maintain publicly accessible
online databases with information about the ads that they run on their platforms.171
Second, the law imposed an “inspection requirement” that obligated plaintiffs to make
records of ad purchasers available to the Maryland Board of Elections. 172 The
Maryland Attorney General can seek injunctive relief to have the ad pulled from the
platform if the platform does not follow either of these provisions.173 Platforms may
also face criminal penalties, including a $250 fine or up to thirty days in prison, for
failing to comply with an injunction that orders an ad’s removal.174
According to the Fourth Circuit, the two provisions implicated the First
Amendment’s protection against compelled speech.175 The Fourth Circuit concluded
that both the publication and inspection requirements compelled political speech for
two reasons.176 First, by requiring the plaintiffs to make certain information available
to the public and to state regulators, the provisions “forc[ed] elements of civil society
to speak when they otherwise would have refrained,” thereby contradicting the longstanding First Amendment tradition that “freedom of speech ‘includ[ed] both the right
to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.’”177 Second, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that these provisions implicated the plainitffs’ First Amendment
right against compelled speech, which, for these particular media plaintiffs, also
implicated the right to anonymous speech by compelling these plaintiffs to identify
an ad purchaser.178 Overall, the court concluded that both provisions “pose[] a real
risk of either chilling speech or manipulating the marketplace of ideas.”179
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld disclosure requirements placed
on the ad purchasers themselves, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland’s
requirements for platforms were fundamentally different because they burdened the
speech of third parties rather than political actors that are “direct participants in the
political process.” 180 Specifically, requirements placed directly on ad purchasers
burden speech without preventing speech entirely because direct purchasers are
incentivized to keep advertising as a tool for reaching voters in an election.181 In
contrast, online platforms, like the plaintiffs here, do not have that same incentive,
169
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and, as a result, the burdens imposed by these requirements could lead platforms to
simply not accept political advertising for Maryland candidates and ballot
measures.182 According to the court, this self-censorship results because Maryland’s
requirements place a financial burden on platforms: They could make a higher profit
selling other types of advertising that do not require record-keeping, and the
requirements open platforms up to legal liability. 183 Consequently, political
advertising may be shut out of the online marketplace of ideas, which could hurt
candidates seeking election.184 For instance, one candidate for Maryland’s House of
Delegates noted that his campaign was hindered by Google’s policy of not accepting
political advertising for Maryland candidates and ballot measures.185
The Fourth Circuit also explained that by compelling disclosure of this
information about ads and ad purchasers through the publication requirement, the law
“‘intru[des] into the function of editors and forces news publishers to speak in a way
they would not otherwise.” 186 Additionally, the court found that the inspection
requirement compelling plaintiffs to make this information available to the state
government created an “unhealthy entanglement” between the state and news
organizations.187 Thus, in the court’s view, the inspection requirement “lack[ed] any
readily discernable limits on the ability of government to supervise the operations of
the newsroom.”188 The Fourth Circuit rejected Maryland’s argument that plaintiffs
may simply “opt-out” of the obligations imposed by the provisions by refusing to
accept regulated advertisements, stating “when a private entity, let alone a newspaper,
decides to host political speech, its First Amendment protections are at their apex. To
contend that news outlets forgo some of their free speech rights by accepting political
speech turns the First Amendment on its head.”189
The parties disagreed over whether the law should be subject to strict or exacting
scrutiny, and the Fourth Circuit declined to reach a conclusion on that point.190 While
strict scrutiny requires a law to be “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling”
government interest,191 the slightly lower standard of exacting scrutiny requires that
compelled disclosures have a “‘substantial relation’ between the governmental
interest and the information required to be disclosed.”192 Although the Fourth Circuit
did not determine whether strict or exacting scrutiny applied here, the court concluded
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that the law was insufficiently tailored to meet the lower standard of exacting scrutiny
for two reasons.193 First, Maryland failed to show that foreign election interference
occurred on news sites like those operated by the plaintiffs.194 Second, Maryland
similarly failed to recognize that different-sized platforms had varying levels of
vulnerability to foreign election interference, and the court specifically noted that
while platforms like Facebook were more susceptible to interference, there was
insufficient evidence to show that large platforms like Facebook and smaller
platforms operated by the plaintiffs needed the same level of regulatory oversight.195
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit was clear in limiting its holding to the specific facts
and plaintiffs of this case. 196 However, the decision raises numerous questions
regarding how states should craft and justify legislation seeking to regulate online
political advertising.
IV. ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCLOSURE
AND TRANSPARENCY
Currently, political advertising that occurs online is often described as “the
political equivalent of the Wild West without sheriffs.” 197 Although candidates
regularly use online media to distribute political advertising, numerous loopholes
exist in federal law that allow online political advertising to go unregulated.198 In
response to Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, the proposed
Honest Ads Act seeks to close this regulatory gap at the federal level by expanding
the scope of political ads that require disclaimers to include online political ads.199
The bill also requires that platforms hosting online political ads maintain publicly
accessible databases containing records of the ads and their purchasers when an ad
purchaser spends more than $500 on ad space during the calendar year.200 Despite
being introduced in the U.S. Senate twice in the past three years, no action has been
taken on the proposed legislation.201
While federal legislative action remains at a stalemate, several states have
taken action since the 2016 presidential elections to increase disclosure and
transparency in online political advertising for state candidates and ballot measures.202
Although each state defines the types of political advertising that are covered slightly
differently, in general these state statutes include either disclaimer requirements, or
both disclaimer requirements and additional record-keeping requirements that
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typically fall on the platform hosting the ads.203 Of the eight states that have directly
addressed online political advertising, five have established both disclaimer and
record-keeping requirements, with Colorado, Vermont, and Wyoming opting to only
implement disclaimer requirements. 204 These state laws are designed to increase
transparency surrounding online political advertising, and, although the state laws are
quite similar, the nuanced differences among them, along with the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in McManus, highlight unanswered questions about what that transparency
should look like and who is responsible for creating it.
The disclaimer requirements for online political ads are fairly similar across
all eight states, and, generally, they require that the ad state the name and, sometimes,
address of the ad’s purchaser.205 This largely fits within our traditional conception of
what political advertising sponsorship disclaimers look like, and, in many cases,
applying these disclaimer requirements to online political advertising was a simple
matter of state legislatures extending the requirements that were already in place for
other types of political ads.206 In some cases, these requirements go beyond what is
typically required for political advertising on traditional media at the federal level.
For example, federal law requires political ads to clearly state the ad’s purchaser and,
if applicable, indicate that the ad was not authorized by a candidate.207 Here, some of
these state laws require that online political advertising purchased by certain political
committees also list the purchasing committee’s top contributors.208
Additionally, five states established record-keeping requirements for online
political ads in addition to the disclaimer requirements.209 In each state, the laws
establish some form of publicly accessible record-containing information about
online political ads and their purchasers.210 These records often include the types of
information various scholars contend should be maintained to increase transparency
of political ads online. For instance, Wood and Ravel called for the FEC to maintain
data on a number of different points, including “when the communications ran; how
much they cost to place and promote; candidates to which the communications refer;
[and] contested seat/issues mentioned.” 211 California, New Jersey, Washington,
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Maryland, and New York all require that at least some of these data points be
maintained in public records.212
Although these five states have each created record-keeping requirements,
they differ in where they place the responsibility for maintaining those records. In
California, Maryland, New Jersey, and Washington, the online platforms that host the
advertisements are required to maintain these records.213 In Maryland specifically,
online platforms must make these records publicly available online.214 In that regard,
Maryland’s statutory scheme is very similar to that of the proposed Honest Ads Act,
which also calls for platforms to maintain public databases on online political ads.215
In contrast to these four states and the federal proposal, in New York, the state
government has the responsibility of maintaining these records.216
States that place this record-keeping responsibility on platforms hosting
political ads define who qualifies as a platform quite broadly. For instance, Maryland
defines an “online platform” as a website or application that sells advertising space
and has at least 100,000 monthly users for most of the past year.217 In Washington,
California, and New Jersey, what qualifies as a platform is seemingly even broader.
Washington places this requirement on all “commercial advertisers,” a term that is
defined as “any person that sells the service of communicating messages,” including
online advertisements.218 Similarly, California defines an “online platform” as any
“public-facing internet website, web application, or digital application . . . that sells
advertisements directly to advertisers,” unless that website or application “displays
advertisements that are sold directly to advertisers through another online
platform.”219 New Jersey simply states that “any person who accepts compensation”
for disseminating political advertising must keep records of the transaction and the ad
itself.220 While the proposed Honest Ads Act places a $500 threshold on purchased
ad space before the record-keeping requirements placed on platforms take effect, only
one state, California, expressly provides a similar dollar threshold.221
Overall, these record-keeping requirements are generally consistent with the
goals of traditional campaign finance regulations because they increase transparency
and better allow voters to evaluate the information they receive through these ads.222
Although the Supreme Court has invalidated campaign finance regulations that seek
to prohibit certain types of speech, the Court has consistently upheld disclosure
212
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requirements for political ads. 223 For example, in McConnell v. FEC, the Court
agreed with the district court’s determination that the “argument for striking down
[the] disclosure provision does not reinforce the precious First Amendment values
that Plaintiffs argue are trampled [by the provision], but ignores the competing First
Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the
political marketplace.”224 Likewise, while the Court in Citizens United v. FEC struck
down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s ban on independent expenditures for
express advocacy and electioneering communications financed by corporate treasury
funds, the Court upheld the disclosure requirements, finding that while “[d]isclaimer
and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, . . . they . . . ‘do not
prevent anyone from speaking.’”225
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court noted three main government
interests in compelled disclosures.226 First, disclosures allow the electorate to better
evaluate candidates for elected office because by knowing the source of campaign
funding, voters can learn about a candidate’s interests and “place each candidate in
the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party
labels and campaign speeches.”227 Second, disclosures prevent both corruption and
the “appearance of corruption.”228 Third, disclosure and record-keeping requirements
can be used to detect violations of contribution limits.229 In addition to these interests
in instituting disclosure requirements, courts have more generally concluded that the
government has a compelling interest in “[p]reserving fair and honest elections and
preventing foreign influence.”230
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in McManus suggests that the
traditionally asserted state interests that have historically justified disclosure
requirements imposed on ad purchasers may be insufficient to justify those
requirements for third parties that host political ads, absent some additional evidence
of a clear problem or harm to electoral integrity.231 In McManus, the Fourth Circuit
determined that Maryland’s interests in deterring foreign interference in state
elections, providing voters with information to make informed decisions, preventing
corruption, and enforcing other campaign finance laws were all “sufficiently
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important” to justify traditional campaign finance regulations.232 However, the court
determined that imposing these requirements on third-party platforms was more
problematic than imposing disclosure requirements on ad purchasers themselves, and,
for these plaintiffs specifically, the law was not narrowly tailored to further
Maryland’s interests.233 Specifically, Maryland failed to produce sufficient evidence
to show that the specific platforms operated by the plaintiffs were used to facilitate
foreign interference in Maryland elections.234 Additionally the Fourth Circuit noted
how the platforms operated by the plaintiffs here stood in contrast to platforms like
Facebook, where there was evidence of interference, and Maryland failed to justify
why both sets of platforms required the same regulation.235 Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit’s opinion suggests that in order to impose record-keeping requirements
broadly on a wide range of platforms that host online political advertising, states
should have some concrete evidence, more than speculation, of an electoral harm
present in political advertising on that specific platform, and that regulating that
platform would address that harm.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit explained how placing Maryland’s recordkeeping responsibility on these specific plaintiffs as news organizations is particularly
problematic.236 According to the court, Maryland’s law “‘intrud[es] into the function
of editors’ and forces news publishers to speak in a way they would not otherwise.”237
Here, the Fourth Circuit rejected Maryland’s argument that the responsibility for
transparency in online political advertising partially rests on the platforms that
disseminate it just as similar responsibilities exist for broadcast stations who must
keep and give records to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) for
public disclosure in the political files.238 Instead, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
rationale of spectrum scarcity, which justifies regulating broadcast stations, simply
does not apply to the internet. 239 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit’s decision
seemingly sets the stage for a scenario in which broadcast news stations have an
obligation of disclosure while, despite the increasing use of online political
advertising, media organizations that operate online do not have that same
responsibility. As a result, news organizations that operate online may have a
competitive advantage over their broadcasting counterparts who face potential legal
liability for failing to comply with disclosure regulations.
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Finally, despite its sweeping language, the McManus case is narrow in that
it deals only with an as-applied challenge brought by a group of media
organizations.240 Ultimately, given the unique position of the plaintiffs in this case, it
is currently unclear how far this opinion will extend, if at all, to online political
advertising laws that target large platforms like Facebook. Nonetheless, McManus
suggests that governments will likely be unable to take a wide-approach by imposing
record-keeping requirements on all or nearly all third parties that distribute online
political advertising.
CONCLUSION
The Mueller report, which was produced after an investigation into foreign
interference in the 2016 presidential election, and more recent reports about the
growth of online political advertising have set the stage for ongoing debate about who
should regulate the online political ad market, as well as what regulatory parameters
would survive constitutional scrutiny. With movement on the federal Honest Ads Act
stalled in Congress, we assessed the efforts of eight states to regulate online political
advertising for state races and one federal appellate court case. Overall, these state
efforts fall within two categories: states that have implemented only disclaimer
requirements for online political advertising and states that have implemented both
disclaimer requirements and some form of record-keeping requirement that is often
placed on the platforms hosting the ads. However, the Fourth Circuit’s recent
decision on Maryland’s requirements for online platforms hosting political ads raises
numerous unanswered questions regarding the constitutionality of these laws and
whether the traditionally asserted justifications for campaign finance regulations will
extend to justify record-keeping requirements on third party platforms.
Scholars have demonstrated that the platforms themselves have not consistently
and transparently maintained policies about online political advertising, much less a
clear database, so state and federal regulation in this area appears inevitable.241 That
said, the McManus decision––and the state statutes themselves––offer some guidance
to regulators about where the responsibilities for transparency should ultimately lie.
Burdening websites, particularly news websites, with such record-keeping raises
valid First Amendment problems regarding compelled speech. However, a lack of
transparency burdens equally important values regarding informed decision-making
by the electorate. This clash of values signals the need, in our view, for an
independent record-keeping body along the lines that New York has established for
independent expenditure committees. In New York, record-keeping for online
political advertising is done by the bipartisan New York State Board of Elections
rather than the online platforms disseminating political ads.242 Just as independent
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expenditure committees are required to submit weekly reports detailing contributions
over $1,000, expenditures over $5,000, and expenditures for online advertising over
$500 to the Board, New York law requires independent expenditure committees to
submit copies “of all political communications paid for by the independent
expenditure committee.”243 For online advertising specifically, the Board maintains
a publicly accessible online database that includes copies of the ad, scripts of any
audio or video elements, descriptions of any visual elements, screenshots of ads
without audio or video elements, and individual images for ads with animated
elements.244 These records are maintained for five years.245
We propose that it would be the responsibility of the advertiser to report their ad
buys to a state election board. The state election board would maintain such
information and make it publicly available. At the federal level, as opposed to placing
a record-keeping responsibility on online platforms as the Honest Ads Act suggests,246
this responsibility should be placed with the FEC. Establishing a record-keeping
system for online political advertising that places the responsibility of maintaining
public records with a government agency as opposed to online platforms would
seemingly avoid the constitutional problems outlined by the Fourth Circuit in
McManus. Unlike Maryland’s requirements for online platforms, a system similar to
New York’s looks more like traditional campaign finance regulations, where there is
a regulatory relationship between government agencies and “direct participants in the
political process”247 as opposed to third parties. These records should contain key
information to promote transparency around online political advertising, including
information like copies of the ad, the ad purchaser’s identity, the cost of the ad, and
information about the audience targeted. However, as Wood notes about disclosure
more generally, we must continue to examine our assumptions about disclosure,248
and this may mean engaging in further research to determine what types of disclosures
about online political advertising are most effective. In addition, these revisions to
state law and the Honest Ads Act should include support for the technical
infrastructure required to track online political advertising, which is likely to be
sizeable. These laws should also be revised to make such data easily available to the
public. Finally, these revised provisions should create opportunities for congressional
review of the law’s disclosure mechanisms and for regular stakeholders to comment.
The problems posed by online political advertising are not insurmountable. Even
the Wild West was eventually conquered and settled. But such change requires
focused attention and investment––and a committed effort from candidates,
committees, platforms, election boards, commissions and lawmakers––to address the
harms, both real and potential, in future state and federal election cycles. As the
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problems uncovered by the Mueller report have demonstrated, nothing less than the
integrity of the voting process depends on it.

